

***Al-Wala' wal Bara'* in Wahhabism: From A Tool to Fight *Shirk* to *Takfir* of Muslim Leaders**

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Abstract

This paper examines the concept of *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* (herein known as WB) in the Salafi-Wahhabi ideology or Wahhabism (Arabic: Wahhabiyyah). It aims to show that the Salafi concept of WB has its roots in Wahhabism and highlight the main factors that have contributed to the development of the concept in Wahhabism in the modern period (twentieth century and beyond). Essentially, the paper attempts to show that WB which started in early Wahhabism as a tool to fight apostasy and innovations in Islam has developed into an important element used by both the Saudi establishment scholars and those who oppose the kingdom to support their religious inclination and political agenda. The Wahhabi scholars who oppose the Saudi rulers on account of their political behaviour have used WB to condemn their rulers while some of them even go to the extent of excommunicating the leaders and thereby legitimizing attacks against them.

Keywords: *Al-Wala' walbara'*, Wahhabism, Salafism, Saudi Arabia, Islamism

Introduction

The Salafi concept of *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* or WB has its roots in Wahhabism. This paper looks at how WB was originally perceived and manifested in early Wahhabism in the eighteenth century and later on developed through the twentieth and early twenty-first century. It shows that the ideological roots of modern Salafi understandings of WB has its roots in the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism who was deeply influenced by the writings of Ibn Taimiyyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim among others.²

As Salafis, Wahhabis believe that WB is indeed central to being a Muslim. As the concept forms part of the Islamic faith, Wahhabis claim that any Muslim who does not show sufficient levels of *wala'* to “true Muslims” (which according to them are Muslims who conform to the Wahhabi traditions) and adequate level of *bara'* of non-Muslims or (or more precisely non-Wahhabi Muslims) is at risk of committing apostasy and becoming a non-Muslim. A Wahhabi scholar, for instance, described the concept of WB as being ‘one of Islam’s foundations’ and ‘of paramount importance’ and described as ‘repugnant’ those Muslims who have taken non-Muslims as friends while portraying enmity towards many Muslims.³ Hence, WB in the eyes of Wahhabi scholars becomes the guiding principle of a Muslims’ relations with the *kuuffar* (non-believers) and “infidels”. This paper illustrates that the religious and political roles of the WB concept have existed since the early days of Wahhabism.

The Wahhabi tradition of WB continues to be inherited by generations that came after Ibn Abd al-Wahhab until the modern period. At the political level, this paper highlights how the rivalry between the Saudis and Ottomans in the late eighteenth century and the Saudi civil war in the nineteenth century have impacted on the development of WB in Wahhabi religious discourse.

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² See Ahmad bin Abd al-Halim b. Abd al-Salam b. Taimiyyah, *Iqtida' al-Sirat al-Mustaqim li Mukhalaqat Ashab Al-Jahim* (Following the Straight Path Against the People of Hellfire), Dar al-Ishbiliyyah li al-nashr wa al-tauzi, Riyadh, 1998; Wagemakers, Joas, “The Transformation of A Radical Concept: *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi”, p. 54.

³ He is Abdul Razzaq al-Afifi, vice-chairman of Saudi Arabia’s Permanent Committee of Research and Fatwa. See his forward message to the book *Al-Wala' wal Bara' in Islam According to the way of the Salaf* by Muhammad Saeed bin Salim Al-Qahtani which is also available at <http://www.islamicemirate.com/E-Books/alWalaawalBaraa1.pdf> (accessed 25 June 2018).

During the rivalry and civil war, WB has played an important role in the debate among Wahhabis scholars on the issue of loyalty (*wala'*) to the political authorities and disavowal (*bara'*) of the “infidels”. The paper attempts to showcase the main factors that have contributed to the development of the concept in the Wahhabi ideology in the modern period (twentieth century and beyond). Three periods in the development of the concept in modern Saudi Arabia will be presented in this paper:

1. From the start of the Wahhabi movement in eighteenth century until today, WB has been used by the Wahhabis to fight *shirk* and *bid'ah* and any practices deemed un-Islamic by the Wahhabis.
2. Official Saudi Wahhabi scholars⁴ in the twentieth century, while retaining the social aspect of *bara'*, which relates to personal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims represented in nourishing hatred and rejecting friendship, endorsed and legitimised political *wala'* to so-called infidels, exemplified by their total silence over Saudi foreign policy, foreign military bases in the country and other manifestations of Saudi alliances with the West.⁵
3. Saudi scholars who oppose the Saudi rulers and the establishment scholars, in particular their foreign policy and their actions, seen as having *wala'* to the West. They condemn the Saudi rulers under the pretext of WB.

In the discussion of WB in modern day Wahhabism, the paper highlights that Wahhabi scholars who oppose the Saudi rulers on account of their political behaviour have used the Wahhabi teachings and heritage, and further developed and radicalized some of its concepts including WB. Using the same Wahhabi teachings and tradition that the state and its establishment scholars hold dear, these Salafis who are mostly represented by the Jihadi faction of modern Salafis, condemn their rulers while some of them even go to the extent of excommunicating the leaders and thereby legitimizing attacks against them.

Wahhabism and the Concept of WB

The Wahhabi ideology emphasizes the importance of *tawhid* (monotheism). *Tawhid* in Wahhabism is more than merely believing in the oneness of God, as it is for all Muslims. The main and most fundamental demands of the Wahhabi mission was the purification of Arabia from unorthodox forms of religiosity and the enforcement of the *shariah* law throughout the Arabian society in order to establish a society based on *tawhid*.⁶ This Wahhabi mission was supported in the political arena by Ibn Saud and the result was that their efforts and sources of legitimacy unified the entire Arabia supposedly “under the rule of the Quran and Sunnah”.

In line with Wahhabism’s call to purify Islam and fight *kufr* (disbelief) through *tawhid*, its practice is manifested in the concept of WB. It is imperative, according to Wahhabism in order to establish the practices of Prophet Muhammad and in fighting any forms of heresy and unbelief. Wahhabis are convinced that the concept will protect them from *bid'ah* (religious innovations) and reinforce their unity in the face of non-Muslim enemies.⁷ By practising WB in their own societies, they believe that this is the effective way to avoid any resemblance to infidels and maintain the purity of Islam. For the same reason, Wahhabis reject much of what they consider part of “infidel culture” such as entertainment and listening to music.⁸ Thus, they believe that WB is the guiding principle for Muslims’ relations with the *kuffar* (non-believers) and use it to make a strict distinction between Islam and other faiths.⁹

Wahhabis emphasize that the roots of their concern with the community system lies in a willingness to withdraw from corrupting innovations and to live in accordance with the example of *salaf al-salib* (pious predecessors) and create a totally Islamic society. However, this quietist concept WB has undergone several transformations within Wahhabism itself through time. The genealogy of the concept’s transformation can be traced to the writings of Ibn Taimiyyah who has exerted a strong influence on the doctrines of Wahhabism including the concept of WB.

⁴They are also known as the establishment *ulema*, or *ulema al-sultab* (regime’s scholars).

⁵ Al-Rasheed, Madawi, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*, p. 37.

⁶Al-Rasheed, Madawi, *History of Saudi Arabia*, pp. 18-19.

⁷As Ibn Taimiyyah’s teachings exert a great influence on Wahhabi thought, the idea to fight *bid'ah* with WB is believed to have originated from the teachings of Ibn Taimiyyah. See Wagemakers, Joas, ‘The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi”, pp. 69-70.

⁸Moussalli, Ahmad, *Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is The Enemy?*, p. 4.

⁹Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, p. 94.

Ibn Taimiyyah developed the idea that the distinction between the believers and non-believers must be well-defined and strictly policed.¹⁰ In his book entitled *Iqtida' al-Sirat al-Mustaqim*, he explained in detail that differences should be maintained between Muslims and non-Muslims in all their interaction. In particular, Ibn Taimiyyah was especially concerned about the influence of Jewish and Christian religious festivals, stressing that true Muslims must avoid these. The basis for this was the Quranic verse he quoted:

O believers, do not take the Jews and the Christians as your friends and protectors, they are friends of each other. And whoever makes them a friend then he is from amongst them. Verily God does not guide the unjust people.¹¹

As a result of his understanding of the verse, he forbade Muslims from having close contact with the Jews and Christians. He also viewed the imitation of the Jews and Christians in their dress as forms of worship, and as showing *wala'* to them. This refers particularly to popular religious rituals like visiting graves and turning burial sites into mosques.¹² Ibn Taimiyyah uses elements of WB to counter these practices which he deemed heretical that has crept into the religion and contaminating it.¹³

Under the precept of WB and based on the teachings of Ibn Taimiyyah, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims. Furthermore, this enmity and hostility towards non-Muslims who are heretical had to be visible and unequivocal.¹⁴ For example, Muslims are not to be the first to greet non-Muslim, imitate them in their dress, language, morality and culture. Similarly, Muslims are forbidden from taking part in celebrations and festivals or any other social event originally invented by non-Muslims as these are signs of showing *wala'* to the *kuffar* and their traditions.¹⁵

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab used the ideas suggested by Ibn Taimiyyah and Ahmad bin Hanbal that will later be called WB to serve as a pillar of the *aqidah*. This is very clear in his writings including his most famous one, *Kitab al-Tawhid* which deals with the oneness of God, and *Kitab Kashf al-Shububat* (Book of Clarification of Uncertainties) which deals with “heretical” acts in the view of Wahhabism such as the intercession of prophets and saints (*tawassul*). This book is considered a continuation of *Kitab al-Tawhid* because both his writings revolve around the subject of *tawhid*. Hence, in the Wahhabi tradition, the doctrine of WB takes on an exclusive and ultimately religious approach. It designated primarily all those who do not adhere to Sunni orthodoxy, especially the Shiites.¹⁶ In addition, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab branded all Shiites as unbelievers and *rafidah* (rejectionists).¹⁷ In the Wahhabi tradition, WB thus became a test of true faith, to show loyalty to God alone as an indispensable part of the Islamic religion.

WB in Early Days of Wahhabism

Wahhabism would not have spread in Arabia had it not been for the fact that in the late eighteenth century the Al-Saud family united itself with the Wahhabi movement and rebelled against the Ottoman Empire in Arabia. The first Saudi state ended with the Ottomans destroying the city of Dir'iyah, the first home of the Saudi kingdom.¹⁸

¹⁰ Ibn Taimiyyah, *Iqtida' al-sirat al-mustaqim mukhalafatashab al-jahim*, pp. 156-303 available at <http://www.tawhed.was/a?a=syed5680> (accessed 23 March 2018); Thomas F. Michel, S.J., *A Muslim Theologian's Response to Christianity: Ibn Taimiyya's Al-Jawab al-Salib*, pp. 84-5; Wagemakers, Joas, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi”, p. 54.

¹¹ Quran 5:51.

¹² Moussalli, Ahmad, *Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is The Enemy?*, pp. 4-5

¹³ See Wagemakers, Joas, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi”, p. 54.

¹⁴ Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, *Muallafat al-Shaykh al-Imam Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab*, Al-Maktabah Al-Saudiyyah, undated, Vol 1, pp. 312-29.

¹⁵ Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, *Amthaq al-'Ura: al-Risalah al-Sadisab in Majmu'at al-Tawhid*, (The Firmest of the Ties: The Sixth Letter in Compilations of Monotheism), Taba'ah Munaqqahah Musahhahah, Dar Ihya' Al-Turath, place not cited, undated, p. 171.

¹⁶ Kepel, Gilles and Jean-Pierre Milelli, *Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words*, p. 168.

¹⁷ See Muhammad Bin Abdur Wahhab, *Al-Risalah fi Al-Radd 'ala al-Rafidah* (Letter on the Refutation of the Rejectionists) available at <http://saaid.net/book/open.php?cat=89&book=647> (accessed 15 August 2018); Lacy, Robert, *The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Sa'ud*, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.; First Edition edition (1982) p. 59. The rejection of Shi'is with respect to WB can be clearly seen in the writing of Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani on WB, *Al-Wala' wal Bara' Min Mafahim Aqidah al-Salaf*, Part 2, Chapter 8, p. 126 (English translation).

¹⁸ David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, p. 33.

During the Saudi-Ottoman rivalry, the concept of WB as a tool to fight *kufr* was implemented by Wahhabi scholars, among others Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's grandson, Sulayman ibn Abdallah (d. 1818).

To understand how WB is manifested in early Wahhabism in both its social and political form, it is important to look at the work of Sulayman. An important factor that must always be recalled when examining the work of past Wahhabi scholars and jurists is the historical development of the movement. We must never lose sight of the fact that considerations of national interests, civil war, territorial occupation and power politics as well as the historical circumstances and the political reality of the period can influence the scholars' views. As Wagemakers puts it 'the concept of WB has developed in various ways in Wahhabi discourse since the nineteenth century. This can be partly ascribed to the civil war that caused the collapse of the second Saudi State (1824-91)'.¹⁹ According to Wagemakers, 'the concept of WB in Wahhabi discourse is contested and the events on the nineteenth century Arabian Peninsula, particularly the Saudi civil war have influenced these contestations over the meaning of the concept'.²⁰

The second decade of the nineteenth century saw the collapsing of the Wahhabi mission and the end of the Saudi state at the hands of the Ottomans. The Saudis withdrew from Hijaz in 1813 and, during the 1815 truce between the Ottomans and the Saudis, some towns and chiefs of Al-Qasim district in Najd abandoned the Saudi cause in the face of the Ottoman forces.²¹ It was during the context of war and betrayal, then, that Sulayman composed his famous treatise entitled *Al-Dalail fi Hukm Muwalat Abl al-Isbrak* (Proofs of the Rule Regarding the Loyalty to the People of Polytheism). It is asserted by Wagemakers that 'historical events such as this produced Wahhabi writings that continue to resonate in the scholarly debate on WB today'.²² Sulayman's treatise revolves around issues of allegiance to infidels, befriending the idolaters, assisting them against Muslims and offering loyalty to them.²³ In the opening discussion of his treatise, he states that whoever 'shows to the idolaters an agreement with their religion out of fear and a wish to placate them is an infidel just like them, even if he hates them and their religion and loves Islam and Muslims'.²⁴ To Sulayman, 'the Ottoman-Saudi military confrontation was not merely a struggle between belief and unbelief'.²⁵ Therefore, he alluded in his treatise to those who were under the Saudi domain and then fell under the Ottoman's and did not migrate or fight as 'folk who once followed Islam' and contended that they are 'worse in their disbelief and more deserving of punishment in the Fire than those in the Prophet's time who did not migrate from Mecca out of attachment to their homes and from fear of infidels'.²⁶

As the rulers of Arabia were struggling to liberate the Arabian soil from the Ottomans, followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab accused the Ottoman of corrupting Islam and hence labeled them as infidels. They declared that Islam protected by the Ottomans was not the true Islam, implying that the *sultan* was not the legitimate leader of the *ummah*. The Wahhabis held that the Arabs were worthier than the Ottomans with regard to *imamah* or leadership. Thus, the authority of the Ottoman rule was rejected and challenged. The Wahhabis also described the Ottomans as the moral equivalent of the Mongols, who earlier had invaded Muslim territories and then converted to Islam. The Ottomans were seen by them as primary enemies of Islam as they had corrupted the religion of Islam and were pretending to be sincere and true Muslims.

The Wahhabis regarded the Ottomans as polytheists (due to their strong attachment to the traditions and practices of Sufism such as visiting tombs which Wahhabis condemned as *shirk*) and *kuffar* along with all who supported them, and most others who claim to be Muslims, but did not live up to the Wahhabi expectations.²⁷

¹⁹Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, p. 104.

²⁰Ibid, p. 94.

²¹David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, p. 247.

²²Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, p. 94.

²³ See Sulayman Ibn Abdallah, *Al-Dalail fi Hukm Muwalat Abl al-Isbrak*, Al-Tibyan Publications, undated. See also Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, p. 95; Abdul Aziz H. Al-Fahad, *From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism*, New York University Law Review, Vol 79, Number 2, May 2004, pp. 485-519.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵ David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, p. 36.

²⁶Sulayman Ibn Abdallah, *Al-Dalail fi Hukm Muwalat Abl al-Isbrak*, p. 131.

²⁷See Sirriyeh, *Elizabeth, Wahhabis, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism*, British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1989), pp. 12-132.

Hence, early Wahhabis regarded the Ottoman caliphate as *al-Dawlah al-Kufriyyah* (Infidel State) and they claimed that those who support the Ottomans or ally themselves to them are infidels.²⁸ During the occupation of the Ottomans, some Arabs began to switch their allegiance to them as a result of being forced to adopt the Wahhabi doctrine. This led the Wahhabi scholars at that time to address the issue of *wala'*. The Saudi rulers and their *ulama* viewed these calls for foreign invasion as grave acts of disloyalty and misplaced *wala'*. As a strong follower of Wahhabi's teachings, Sulayman was especially concerned with the relationship proper between true believers and those they regarded as *mushrikun* and *kuffar* as well as the sensitive question of how to handle hypocrisy in their midst. His book demonstrates that those who side with the "infidels" in their policy are themselves infidels. He wrote:

Know, may God bless you, that when a person shows approval of the polytheist's religion, for fear of, or in appeasement of flattery to them to avoid their evil, that he is an unbeliever like them, even if he dislikes their religion and hates them and loves Islam and Muslims, if that were the only [error] committed. However, if he is in a protected realm, and he invites them, obeys them and shows approval of their false religion and assists them with help and money, becomes loyal to them and terminates loyalty between himself and the Muslims, and becomes a soldier of polytheism, and tomb and their people...., no Muslim should doubt he is an unbeliever."²⁹

Sulayman labelled Muslims as polytheists under the pretext of WB.³⁰ He also wrote another epistle entitled *Anthaq 'Ura al-Iman* (Faith's Surest Bonds) in which the same title of his writing was later used by Juhayman Al-Utaibi³¹ who stormed the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. This particular epistle of Sulayman was dedicated to elucidating the rulings regarding proper *wala'* to Muslims and *bara'* of the non-Muslims.³² Another writing of Sulayman which surrounds the theme of WB is *Fi Hukum Safirilabilad as-shirk* (On the Rule Governing Travel to The land of Idolatry).³³

Before the conflict between the Saudi and Ottomans, it is believed that the concept of WB had only in many cases, encompassed the religious and social dimension, such as the obligation of *hijrah* from non-Muslim to Muslim land and regulations regarding Muslim and non-Muslim relationship. Sulayman's stand on loyalty to the polytheists and infidels, interpreted in the context of the Saudi's struggle against the Ottomans has added a political dimension to the concept of WB. This, he argues, is obviously a grave sin and serious offence for Muslims to leave the community of believers and take the side of the unbelieving enemy. Such a Muslim, according to him, is an unbeliever and has to be treated as an apostate.³⁴ This political dimension of the concept was later adopted by Juhayman Al-Utaibi and Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi in the twentieth century.³⁵

In the late nineteenth century, yet another prominent Saudi scholar advanced the concept of WB. Like Sulayman, Hamad Ibn Atiq (d. 1883) wrote a famous document entitled *Sabil al-Najat wal Fikak min Muwalat al-Murtaddimwa al-Atrak* (The Path of Salvation and Freedom Against Befriending the Apostates and Turks).

Where he pointed out that Muslims should not just refrain from giving their loyalty to non-Muslims but should also actively disavow them. Ibn Atiq's treatise was written in reaction to the civil war that broke out between Abdallah Bin Faisal Bin Turki (d. circa 1880) and his brother Sa'ud Bin Faisal Bin Turki (d. 1875) during the second Saudi State.³⁶ When their father, Faisal bin Turki who was the ruler of the second Saudi State died in 1865, Abdallah became the new ruler. However, his legitimacy as the ruler of Arabia was challenged militarily by his brother, Saud.

²⁸ Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, *Bayan al-Najahwa al-Fikak: al-Risalah al-Thaniya 'Ashra in Majmu'at al-Tawhid*, (Explanation of Salvation and Freedom: The Twelve Letter in the Compilation of Monotheism), pp. 358-68.

²⁹ Sulayman Ibn Abdallah, *Al-Dalalil fi Hukum Muwalat Abl al-Israk*, Al-Tibyan Publications, p. 149.

³⁰ See Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, pp. 93-110.

³¹ It is believed that Juhayman's works and teachings had significantly influenced and shaped the worldview of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi.

³² See Abdul Aziz H. Al-Fahad, *From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism*, pp. 485-519; Sirriyeh, Elizabeth, *Wahhabis, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism*, Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Volume 16, Number 2, 1989, pp. 123-132.

³³ See Sirriyeh, Elizabeth, *Wahhabis, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism*, p. 124.

³⁴ See Ibid and Abdul Aziz H. Al-Fahad, *From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism*, p. 496.

³⁵ See Wagemakers, Joas, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi", p. 55.

³⁶ Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, p. 96.

To prevent Saud from claiming power and take over as ruler, Abdallah decided to seek military assistance from the Ottomans from the neighboring country, Iraq. As the Wahhabis regarded the Ottomans as polytheists, seeking help from the latter who are “infidels” was considered an act of disloyalty. A Wahhabi judge by the name of Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Ajlan (d. unknown) was even ex-communicated (pronounced as *kafir*) by Ibn Atiq due to his support for Abdallah’s decision.³⁷ It was at this point of the Saudi history that Ibn Atiq wrote his treatise which was partly built on the earlier work of Sulayman. Ibn Atiq wrote:

So his saying ‘...and there has become apparent...’ In other words, it has become clear and apparent. And consider the preceding of ‘...enmity...’ with ‘...hatred...’ because the first is more important than the second. This is because; the person may hate the polytheists (*mushrikin*), while not taking them as enemies, So, (if this were the case, then) he would not have come with the obligation that was upon him, until he attains both the enmity and the hatred. And it is a must, as well, that the enmity and hatred are both open and apparent and clear. And known that even if the hatred is tied to the heart, then it does not benefit him until its effects are shown and its signs become clear. And that abandonment (of them). Then and that point, the enmity and hatred will become apparent.³⁸

According to Ibn Atiq, Muslims who do not actively show enmity and disavowal to non-Muslims are *kuffar*.³⁹ As for hostility to the infidels and polytheists, Ibn Atiq argues that God has made it obligatory and emphasized its obligatory nature, and made loyalty to them illegal and was strict in it, to the extent that in the *Book of God* there is no ruling whose proofs are as numerous and clear as this one, after the obligation of *tawhid*.⁴⁰

Ibn Atiq connects the concept of WB to the concept of *tawhid*, which, as illustrated earlier, is the main focus of the Wahhabi mission.⁴¹ Moreover, as Wagemakers writes, Ibn Atiq’s work ‘shows a move away from simply condemning misplaced *wala*’... towards the necessity of showing *bara*’.⁴² According to Ibn Atiq, one should not live among the idolaters and unbelievers if one cannot declare his religion. However, for him, being able to proclaim the faith and perform the prayer does not qualify as declaring religion. One has to ‘disavow the people of unbelief, amongst whom he is staying’, and must declare ‘to them that they are unbelievers and that one is their enemy. If that does not happen, one has not declared the religion’.⁴³

Here, it can be seen that WB is no longer confined to matters of condemning misplaced *wala*’ but to enforce the need to show *bara*’ to the enemies of Islam. As such, it is at this juncture that WB as it is understood in the Wahhabi ideology became a fundamental part of the Islamic faith. Those who fail to practice this are no longer just deviant or errant Muslims but are considered as fallouts from the Muslim community entirely. The act of seeking help from the infidels (*isti’anabilkuffar*) as seen from the events of the Saudi-Ottoman rivalry and the Saudi civil war in early and late nineteenth century as described earlier, was seen by the Wahhabi scholars as an expression or acts of misplaced loyalty that violate the concept of WB. As we shall see, this political interpretation of WB continues to reverberate in the thoughts and intellectual system of Salafi scholars in the twentieth and twenty-first century.⁴⁴

Thus far, we observed the hallmark of WB in Wahhabi ideology - the tying in of WB to the basis of Islam (*aqidah*) and elevation of the importance of WB in Quranic verse 60:4 (*Millat Ibrahim*). Quranic verse 60:4 is often used by Wahhabi scholars to highlight the importance and legitimacy of WB. They argue that *Millat Ibrahim* is of extreme importance because while many Muslims are familiar with the concept of having enmity towards the *kuffar* and their false deities, within their hearts, there seems to be a pervasive lack of awareness regarding the outward enmity and what is required to be demonstrated in terms of aggression, hostility and warfare.

³⁷Ibid; David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, p. 64.

³⁸Hamad bin Atiq, *Sabil al-Najat wal Fikak min Muwalat al-Murtaddin wa Abl al-Israk* taken from Basics on *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’* at <http://moderatesrefuted.blogspot.com/> (accessed 23 March 2018) and <http://www.twahed.ws/r?i=mnndyzdnz> (accessed 14 February 2010).

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Wagemakers, Joas, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’* in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi”, p. 87.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibn Atiq, Hamad, *Sabil al-Najat wal Fikak min Muwalat al-Murtaddin wa Abl al-Israk* and from the same author, *At-Tab’thirmin al-safarilabilad al-mushrikin* (Warning Against Travel to the Countries of Idolaters) available at <http://www.tawahed.ws/r?i=23ydotwi> (accessed 14 February 2018).

⁴⁴Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala’ wal Bara’*, p. 94.

WB in Twentieth Century Wahhabism

The context of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries differs a great deal from the context of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. What might have been usual and common in the context of the nineteenth century may prove to be increasingly problematic as the twenty-first century progresses. There have been both international developments as well as extensive educational, economic and social changes in Saudi society during the second half of the twentieth century. Although it can be argued that society 'remains conservative' and that it, has been little affected by nationalism and secularism, the impact of rapid social and economic changes cannot be ignored.⁴⁵ However, this stringent and rigid form and interpretation of WB especially with regards to dealing with the 'other', has survived and developed even further in the context of the twentieth century.

Before embarking on the discussion of the development of the political dimension of the concept in the twentieth century Wahhabism, it is essential that we first mention the religious and social dimension of the concept in modern day Wahhabism. In the twentieth century, the concept of WB does not change much as it was before and continues to play an important role in the Wahhabi ideology. The Wahhabis use this concept not only as a tool to fight *shirk* and *bid'ah*, but also as the main guiding principle that regulates the ruling of Muslim and non-Muslim relationship. Wahhabi scholars in Saudi Arabia and also outside the country actively promote this concept in their sermons and writings.

For instance, former Mufti and the Kingdom's scholar par excellence, Ibn Baz ordered Muslims to withhold their greetings to non-believers and cultivate hatred for them on the basis of WB.⁴⁶ In fact, Ibn Baz was among the major religious power behind spreading the Wahhabi doctrine. WB, according to him is important for the purification of Islamic belief and to avoid anything that could tarnish the purity of the religion. Ibn Baz even went as far as ordering Muslims to nourish *baghda'* (hatred) rather than *mawaddah* (affection) in their hearts for infidels.⁴⁷ For the non-Wahhabi Muslims, Ibn Baz labeled them as pagans, apostates, deviants, innovators and attacked the *ulema* who were not in agreement with the Wahhabi teachings.⁴⁸ He also outlawed advice to rulers and the liberalizing of political institutions.⁴⁹ As a former president of the Directorships of Scholarly Research, *Ifa'* (Religious Creed) *Da'wah* (Missionary) and *Irshad* (Guidance), Ibn Baz is on record for issuing a *fatma* declaring as un-Islamic the Palestinian people's uprising.⁵⁰ In the late 1960s, he declared any and all forms of cooperation with the *kuffar* as prohibited.⁵¹

Another Saudi scholar, Salih al-Fawzan argues that one of the ways for Muslims to practise WB is by performing *hijrah* to the Islamic world because settling in the countries of the non-believers will lead to forming loyalty to them.⁵² *Hijrah*, according to Al-Fawzan is required to flee oneself from *fitnah* or temptation and *shirk*.⁵³ By performing *hijrah*, Muslims can thus show their unwillingness to engage in relations with non-Muslims in any way. This is necessary for Muslims, since settling in the lands of unbelief leads to loyalty to the infidels (*muwalat al-kafirin*).

The fundamental rule according to the Wahhabis is that friendship and any contact with non-Muslims is *haram*. This includes, for example giving a *kafir* gifts during Christmas which constitutes part of the social dimension of WB. One Wahhabi scholar writes 'It is not permissible to give a *kafir* a gift on the day of one of his festivals, because that is regarded as approving of or participating in celebration of the false festival. If the gift is something that will help in celebrating the festival, such as food, candles and the like, then it is even more *haram*, and some of the scholars are of the view that this is *kufr*.'⁵⁴ However, he maintains that it is permissible for a Muslim to accept gifts from their Christian neighbor on the day of their festival subject to the following conditions:

1. The gift should not be meat that has been slaughtered for the festival.

⁴⁵Lapidus, Ira, *A History of Islamic Societies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 573.

⁴⁶See for example 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Baz, *Ma 'na l-Wala' wa-l-Bara'* available at <http://www.binbaz.org.sa> (accessed 23 April 2018).

⁴⁷Al-Rasheed, Madawi, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a new Generation*, p. 36.

⁴⁸Ahmad Moussalli, "Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is the Enemy?" *A Conflict Forum*, p. 8.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Sayyid Yusuf al-Rifa'i in his *Nasiba li Ikhwanina 'Ulama' Najd* ("Advice to Our Brothers the Scholars of Najd") available at http://sunnah.org/aqida/Sh_Rifai/Default.htm (accessed 13 January 2018).

⁵²Salih Bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan, *Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, p. 4.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴ Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid, *Qabul Hadiyyah al-Kafir fi Yaumiyyah* (Accepting a Gift From A Kafir On The Day of His Festival) available at <http://www.islam-qa.com/en/cat/234/ref/islamqa/85108> (accessed 15 March 2018).

2. It should not be something that may be used to help in imitating them on the day of their festival, such as candles, eggs, palm leaves etc.
3. One should explain to his/her children the belief in *al-wala' walbara'*, lest a love of this festival or a fondness for the giver be instilled in their hearts.
4. The gift should be accepted with the aim of softening her heart and calling her to Islam, not with friendship and love.⁵⁵

The Wahhabi scholars present WB as a social concept through a thorough explanation of its roots in the Quran and the meaning of the concept. On the basis of numerous verses, such as Quran 5:51, 58: 22, 60:1 and 60:4, the scholars concluded that *wala'* entailed friendship, love and affection for non-Muslims and their religion. They concluded that Muslims should treat non-Muslims by showing them *bara'* instead, i.e. to disassociate and show hatred and enmity to them. Muslims are forbidden to participate in non-Islamic celebrations, congratulate non-Muslims on the occasion of their religious holidays and greet them first when encountering them.⁵⁶ Looking like the non-Muslims in dressing, behaviour or names are also forms of showing loyalty to the non-Muslims.⁵⁷ Wahhabi scholars explained that all these rulings serve to keep Muslims away from anything that might stain the alleged purity of their beliefs and lead to loyalty, expressed as love, affection or friendship for supposedly un-Islamic things.

Political Dimension of WB in Twentieth Century Wahhabism

It is important to note that with the establishment of modern Saudi state in twentieth century, Wahhabism became a religious/ ideological discourse promoted and protected by political authority. The religious and social sphere in Saudi Arabia is controlled by the official scholars who are appointed by the state. Official scholars of Saudi Arabia usually occupy the highest religious position in the kingdom such as the Grand Mufti and sit in the Board of Senior Ulema (*hai'atkiibar al-ulamā*) and the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions (*Lajnah al-da'im alilbubuthal'ilmiyahwalifta*). Indeed, the state needed these scholars to control the social sphere to ensure compliance of the people.

Under state control, there were in fact several interpretations and even contradictions within the hegemonic Wahhabi discourse – including the concept of WB. For example, official Wahhabi scholars in the twentieth century, while retaining the social aspect of *bara'*, which relates to personal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims represented in nourishing hatred and rejecting friendship, endorsed and even legitimised political *wala'* to so-called infidels, exemplified by their total silence over Saudi foreign policy, foreign military bases in the country and other manifestations of Saudi alliances with the West.⁵⁸ The manner Wahhabi scholars apply the social and religious aspect of WB, encapsulated in issues like rulings of participation in non-Islamic festivals, clearly shows their abandonment of the political relevance of the concept recognised in the writings of early scholars mentioned earlier.⁵⁹

Official Wahhabi scholars are aware that they need to remain subservient to the Saudi rulers because they realized that their ideas could only be implemented under the protection of a ruler.⁶⁰ Although the diplomatic and trade relations that Saudi Arabia has with non-Muslim countries and the strong ties it enjoys with the United State seems to clash with the idea that Muslims should stay away from 'infidels', Wahhabi scholars dare not to apply their ideas on WB to politics. If they do, it will lead to heavy criticism and could cause chaos between them and the rulers.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶See fatwa by Salih Al-Munajjid on "Non-Muslim Celebrations" available at <http://islamqa.info/en/cat/2021> (accessed 12 March 2018); Salih Al-Fawzan, *Al-Walawal Bara*, p. 7.

⁵⁷Ibid; Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani, *Al-Wala' walbara' min Mafahim Aqidah Al-Salaf*, Part 3, Chapter 6, p. 44. More on this social role of WB will be explained in the next chapter.

⁵⁸ Al-Rasheed, Madawi, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a new Generation*, p. 37.

⁵⁹Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, p. 97.

⁶⁰It could be explained here that concerning state and religion, IbnTaimiyyah believed that the *ulema* are responsible for the protection of the divine law, and that a government is regarded as Islamic by virtue of the support it gives to Islam and to the *ulema*. One can accept the rule of anyone who follows the *shariah*. This understanding had an important effect on the Wahhabi ideology that accepted Al-Saud's dynasty as a legitimate and hereditary Islamic government after taking refuge in Dir'iyyah, a territory controlled by [the] Al-Saud family. See TalipKucükcan, *Some Reflections on the Wahhabiyah Movement*, excerpted from *HamdardIslamicus*, Vol. XVIII No. 2 (1995) available at <http://www.sunnah.org/audio/onwahhabis.htm> (accessed 30 July 2018).

In fact, Wahhabi scholars provided an unequivocal fatwa legitimizing the solicitation of help from non-Muslim forces in defense of the Saudi state.⁶¹ The event of 1990 Gulf war is a good example to illustrate the political dimension of WB in Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia. In fact, the war has a great impact on the religio-political discourse of internal Saudi Islamist currents. One could notice the mixed reactions of Saudi scholars over the manner the Saudi Kingdom dealt with intervention in the war, especially its decision to invite foreign Western forces. While official scholars supported the kingdom's decision and *fatwa* to invite American troops to Saudi soil, this move triggered an escalation of criticism by scholars belonging to the *SahwaIslamiyyah* (Islamic Awakening) which resulted in their detention.⁶²

The official statement by the Council of Senior Ulema of Saudi Arabia supporting the actions taken by the Saudi rulers states the following:

The Council of Senior 'Ulama, therefore, supports actions taken by the leader, may God lead him to success, of inviting qualified forces with equipment that bring fear and terror to those who wish to commit aggression against this country. This is his obligation dictated by necessity under the present circumstances and made inevitable by the painful facts and the rules and proofs of the *shari'ah* making it incumbent upon the leader of the Muslims to resort to the assistance of those with the ability and through whom the purpose is achieved. The Qur'an and Prophetic Sunnah show that it is necessary to be prepared and to take precautions before it is too late. . . .⁶³

We can see that the excuse these scholars gave in legitimizing a ruling which runs contrary to the Wahhabi concept of WB is necessity (*dharurah* a legal doctrine allowing the prohibited).⁶⁴ This scenario of scholars/rulers alliance in Saudi Arabia is important in the Saudi politics as the official Wahhabi religio-political discourse is dependent on its scholars. Thus, according to Madawi Rasheed 'official Wahhabism in the twenty-first century is a discourse of consent as it propagates religious interpretations that require subservience to political authority'.⁶⁵ Its scholars provided the state with intellectual input, especially the religious discourse which confirmed the servitude of religion to the state. Thus, official Wahhabi scholars established with clarity the position of official Wahhabism which is radical in its ruling of social matters but extremely accommodating of political decisions on the basis of convenience and necessity.

In fact, such a scenario is not something new in the modern history of Saudi Arabia. In the early formation of the kingdom of the Kingdom, King Abdul Aziz had a relationship and even sought assistance from the British. For instance, Daryl Champion states that one of the paradoxes that accompanied the King's 'rise to dominance' is that he 'had no compunction about dealing with the British, even though the Muslim world had criticised the Hashimite-British alliance'.⁶⁶ Moreover Al-Rasheed states that 'the Al-Saud were more than happy to seek military and financial help from so-called infidels as early as 1915, and even to pursue a policy that was subservient to imperial powers'.⁶⁷

While many scholars, especially those who are under the auspices of the Saudi rulers stay away from the political aspect of WB, there are some Wahhabi scholars who are against the idea of allying with the "infidel" countries such as America. Using the concept of WB, these scholars argue that is a grave sin to support or ally oneself to the infidels. Some of them have also gone to the extent of proclaiming the Saudi rulers as *kuffar* – and hence practice the act of *takfir* on the rulers. This political aspect of WB adopted by such scholars can be seen in two significant scenarios in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century.

⁶¹ The statement by the council of Senior Ulema supporting actions taken by the Saudi leader inviting qualified forces to respond to the aggression against Saudi Arabia was issued on August 14, 1990 and published in, among others, the official gazette, 3319 Umm Al-Qura 24, August 18, 1990.

⁶² See Chapter Four of this thesis for more on the Sahwa and their position on this issue.

⁶³ Translation of this statement is taken from Al-Fahad, Abdul Aziz, *From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism*, p. 518.

⁶⁴ Al-Rasheed, Madawi, *A History of Saudi Arabia* pp.163-87.

⁶⁵ Al-Rasheed, Madawi, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*, p. 26; Prohibiting Politics: Saudi Wahhabi Religious Discourse available at

<http://www.madawialrasheed.org/index.php/site/more/112/> (accessed 12 May 2018).

⁶⁶ Champion, Daryl, *The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform*, p. 51.

⁶⁷ Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*, p. 10.

One is the 1990 Gulf War, where Saudi rulers invited hundreds of thousands of American troops to Saudi Arabia to defend itself from being attacked by Iraq.⁶⁸ Second, is the war against Afghanistan and Iraq launched by the United States in 2001 where Saudi Arabia retained its strong relations with the United States. These scholars therefore took the political relevance of WB to a new level by starting to criticise Saudi Arabia for asking help from the infidels and strengthening ties with them. The notion of *isti'anabilkuffar* is heavily debated in the political development of WB in the twentieth century.

Among these scholars who oppose the Saudi state was Hamud Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi (d. 2002),⁶⁹ a well-known and influential Saudi scholar who is allegedly linked to the Al-Qaeda organization. His students included a number of important Saudi religious leaders, among them the current grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al Al-Shaikh (b. 1940). Al-Shuaibi has published religious edicts supporting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, including the destruction of the Buddhist statues, as part of *jihad* against the infidels. He religiously justified Al-Qaeda's attack on the United States in September 2001 and gave religious legitimacy to the suicide attacks against Israel carried out by Palestinians.⁷⁰

Al-Shuaibi wrote *Al-Qawl al-Mukhtar fi Hukm al-Isti'ana bi al-Kuffar* (Chosen Words on the Rulings of Those who Seek the Assistance of the Infidels). He deals extensively with the notion of *isti'anabilkuffar*, as the title suggests, and was very apparent in his judgement. After first dealing with the concept of WB in general, he quickly goes on to interpret it in a political way and refers to states, concluding that asking non-Muslims for help in fighting other Muslims is forbidden. He even states that asking a state for help in fighting other Muslims is even worse than asking individuals because states are more powerful and can thus do more damage to Islam.⁷¹

Al-Shuaibi's position on *isti'anabilkuffar* can also be seen in his fatwa⁷² expressing opposition to the fatwa issued by Dr Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (b.1926), a well-known Egyptian scholar, allowing American Muslim soldiers' participation in the US-led war in Afghanistan in 2001.⁷³ Using the concept of WB, Al-Shuaibi stated that it is imperative upon all Muslims to support the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to oppose the American war against them. He asserted that any Muslim who takes the side of the unbelievers in their way against Muslims is himself an apostate and unbeliever. He further states WB is one of the fundamentals of the religion and is the foundation of faith and belief. For Al-Shuaibi, *wala'* necessitates that Muslim always loves and take sides of Muslims, whereas *bara'* necessitates severing all ties with non-Muslims, holding no love for them and maintaining a safe distance from them. He refers to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's saying that aiding and supporting non-Muslim against Muslims is an act of apostasy (*kufri naqil 'an millat*).⁷⁴ As a Salafi scholar, Al-Shuaibi understood the Quranic concept of WB as an absolute, ultimate and totally free from the human context of their application. Like other Salafis, Al-Shuaibi described WB as a foundation of the Islamic faith, thus placing it on the same level as *tawhid*.

In fact, Al-Shuaibi understood WB not as two separate concepts but as one, according to which a Muslim's allegiance and loyalty to other Muslims is contingent upon, and tied to, his disassociation from the unbelievers. For Al-Shuaibi, moreover, any act or expression that contravenes this understanding of WB is sufficient to violate the boundaries of Islam.

⁶⁸ See Abdul Aziz H. Al-Fahad, *From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism*, p. 514.

⁶⁹ For biography of Al-Shuaibi see <http://www.tibyan.com./biography.php?id=185> (accessed 16 April 2018).

⁷⁰ Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi, *What Drives Saudi Arabia to Persist in Terrorist Financing? Al-Jihad bi-al-Mal - Financial Jihad Against the Infidels* available at <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp531.htm> (accessed 23 March 2018).

⁷¹ Humud b. Uqla Al-Shuaibi, *Al-Qawl al-Mukhtar fi Hukm al-Isti'ana bi-l-Kuffar*, available at <http://www.saaaid.net> (accessed 01 April 2018).

⁷² Al-Shuaibi's fatwa is entitled "*al-Wala' wal Bara' waWujubnusrab al-Taliban waHukm man Zahara al-Amrikan 'Alaiba* (Loyalty and Disavowal and the Obligation to Support the Taliban and the Rulings of those who Supported the Americans) available at <http://aloqla.com/mag/sections.php?op=printpage-thartid=42> (accessed 12 March 2010).

⁷³ See M. Nafi, Basheer, *Fatwa and War: On the Allegiance of the American Muslim Soldiers in the Aftermath of September 11*, Islamic Law and Society, Volume 11, Number 1, 2004, pp. 108-113.

⁷⁴ Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, *Al-Risalah Al-Tasi'ah :Nawaqid al-Islam in Muallafat Al-Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab*, p. 386 accessed from <http://shaydzmi.wordpress.com/2011/02/28/nawaqid/> (accessed 03 August 2018).

Another scholar who expressed the issue of *isti'anabilkuffar* is Nasr Al-Fahad, who wrote *Al-Tibyan fi Kufr Man A'ana al-Amrikan* (Clarification on the Apostasy of Those who assists the Americans).⁷⁵ The book is endorsed by Al-Shuaibi and two other Saudi belonging to the "Al-Shuaibi" school of thought i.e. Sulayman Al-Ulwan and Ali Al-Khudair. On the prohibition of assisting the infidels against other Muslims, Al-Fahad in his book pointed out that supporting America in its fight against Muslims is an act of *kufr*. He provided a long outline of what he believes as American immortality and debauchery and of the U.S "war on Islam". Condemning the US in his book, Al-Fahad states that:

America is indeed the head of *kufr*, atheism and the central base of corruption and moral decay – it is the land of shame, crime, vile and evil. The *shaytan* (satan) has indeed nested upon it and placed his shrine in it.⁷⁶

Al-Fahad distinguishes two forms of *wala'* that Muslims can show to non-Muslims: *tawalli* and *muwalat*.⁷⁷ The former involves "love for the religion of the unbelievers" (*mahabbat din al-kuffar*) and "love for their victory" (*mahabbatintisaribim*). Helping the *kuffar* against Muslim is also a form of *tawalli*, according to Al-Fahad, and amounts to "unbelief and apostasy" (*kufrwariddab*). Hence, *tawalli* removes a person from the domain of Islam as it includes love of one's enemy and his religion and assisting him against Muslims. *Muwalat* on the other hand, involves forms of *wala'* that are forbidden but do not reach the level of *kufr* and are therefore less grave sins. This category includes, among other things its social manifestation such as initiating greetings upon non-Muslims.⁷⁸

Al-Fahad based his arguments on the dangers of *tawalli* based on the writings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who claimed that acts of helping infidels against Muslims is a factor that removes a Muslim from the domain of Islam (*naqidhlil Islam*).⁷⁹ In the Wahhabi tradition, *nawaqidh al-Islam* (factors that removes a person from the domain of Islam) among others include, polytheism, association with God, preferring another authority other than Islam and assisting infidels against Muslims which comes under the concept of WB.⁸⁰

The development of WB was taken a step further by Muhammad Al-Mas'ari (b. 1948) who is very critical of Saudi Arabia's decision to permit un-Islamic forces on Arabian soil to fight Iraq during the Gulf War of 1990.⁸¹ Al-Mas'ari, a Saudi who lives in exile in London since 1994, runs the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights and is an adviser to the Islamic Human Rights Commission. Al-Mas'ari argues that WB should not be equated with issues like love and friendship or greeting non-Muslims first, but has to do with war and peace.⁸² Like Al-Shuaibi and Al-Fahad, Al-Mas'ari also published a document criticizing the Saudi State entitled *Al-Adillat al-Qat'iyyah 'ala 'Adam Shar'iyyat al-Dawlah al-Saudiyyah* (Decisive Evidence for the Illegitimacy of the Saudi State).⁸³ In his book, Al-Mas'ari criticizes Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself for entering into an alliance with the Saudi family which had, in his view, deprived the Wahhabi call of its allegedly universal purpose.⁸⁴

⁷⁵ For an introduction to Al-Fahad's book, see *Al-Rasheed, Madawi, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*, pp 141-9. For more on Jihadi Salafism in contemporary Saudi Arabia see Hegghammer, Thomas, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010.

⁷⁶ Nasir Bin Hamad Al-Fahad, *The Exposition Regarding The Disbelief of One that Assists the Americans*, Al-Tibyan Publications, undated, p. 47.

⁷⁷ Al-Rasheed, Madawi, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*, p. 144. See also A Study Concerning the Difference Between Concerning *Tawalli* and *Muwaalaat* at <http://www.salafipublications.com> (accessed 01 April 2018).

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Al-Rasheed, Madawi, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*, p. 144.

⁸⁰ Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, *Al-Risalah Al-Tasi'ah :Nawaqid al-Islam in Muallafat Al-Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab*, p. 386.

⁸¹ For more on Al-Mas'ari's critical view on Saudi Arabia see *A Saudi Oppositionist's View: An Interview With Dr. Mubammad Al-Massari*, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 1 Issue: 7, December 4, 2003 available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26182&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=178&no_cache=1 (accessed 30 July 2018).

⁸² Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, p. 103.

⁸³ See Muhammad Bin Abdullah Al-Mas'ari, *Al-Adillat al-Qat'iyyah 'ala 'Adam Shar'iyyat al-Dawlah al-Saudiyyah*, Lajnah Al-Difa' 'an Al-Huquq Al-Shar'iyyah, Al-Taba'ah Al-Sadisah Mazidah wal Munaqqahah, 2002. This 504-page book is available at <http://www.tajdeed.org.uk/ar/posts/list/23.page> (accessed 20 August 2018).

⁸⁴ See Algar, Hamid, *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay*, p. 64.

Al-Mas'ari also criticizes scholars like Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi and Salih Al-Fawzan for focusing more on the social aspects of WB. He states that Al-Fawzan and others have dealt with issues of allegedly misguided *wala'* in the personal sphere but did not see anything wrong in accepting hundreds of thousands of infidel American soldiers to fight Iraq and destroy it (in the 1990 Gulf War).⁸⁵ The mistake that Al-Fawzan and others have made, according to Al-Mas'ari, is to equate the prohibition of "resembling the infidels" (*tashabbuh al-kuffar*) with WB. He believes that these are actually two different issues with the former being simply sinful behaviour while the second refers to grave acts of *kufr* in times of war and peace.⁸⁶

Perhaps, the most prominent and vocal scholar who opposes the Saudi state using the concept of WB is Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi.⁸⁷ Al-Maqdisi is heavily influenced by the writings of Juhayman Al-Utaibi, the leader of al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM) who stormed the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979. Juhayman has used the concept of WB as a political tool against the Saudi rulers.⁸⁸ However, unlike Al-Maqdisi, Juhayman did not base on it the *takefir* of the Saudi and Arab regimes, a step that would prove catastrophic in the evolution of this concept in general and in the Jihad-Salafi trend in modern Salafism.⁸⁹

Juhayman revived the concept of WB from the eighteenth and nineteenth century Wahhabi scholars such as Sulayman bin Abdallah and Hamad bin Atiq. Using the concept of *Millat Ibrahim*, Juhayman called for the true Islamic community which has to be disassociated from all forms of impiety. He also introduced the concept of *Anthaq'Ura al-Iman* (the strongest bonds of faith),⁹⁰ meaning the links that unite Muslims with each other and impose on them mutual solidarity. Both *Millat Ibrahim* and *Anthaq'Ura al-Iman* converged in the principle of WB which Juhayman made the defining principle for correct Islamic behaviour.⁹¹

However, unlike Juhayman, Al-Maqdisi connects the concept of WB not only to politics but also *takefir*. This was made possible by his expansion of the meaning of the word 'worship' to incorporate 'forms of worship that have nothing to do with matters usually associated with that word, such as political obedience and willingness to abide by a country's laws. As Wagemakers writes:

This way, Al-Maqdisi not only radically changes *wala'* (loyalty), but by equating the application of and adherence to man-made laws with un-Islamic worship he also accuses present-day Muslim politicians and leaders of *shirk* (association with God) and therefore of being *kuffar* (unbelievers).⁹² As Al-Maqdisi himself states, while explaining the main pillars of his Jihadi Salafi orientation or thought, 'the main priority of this current is calling people to *tawhid*'.⁹³ The second pillar, however, which according to him, 'distinguishes this current from others is *al-wala' walbara'*, which is one of the most trustworthy ties of *tawhid*.⁹⁴ Al-Maqdisi continues to explain:

The first duty upon *al-muwahhid* (the monotheist) is to disavow of and disbelieve in the scattered gods and the many names that are being worshipped other than God, which in the past took the form of stones and primitive idols, and in our time are the rulers and legislators and their man-made laws and legislations.

⁸⁵Ibid; Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, p. 103.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷ See Joas Wagemakers, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi", p. 59.

⁸⁸See Thomas Hegghammer and Stephane Lacroix, *Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Jubayman al-Utaybi Revisited*, International Journal of Middle East Studies (vol. 39, no. 1, 2007, pp. 103-122; Wagemakers, Joas, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi", p. 90.

⁸⁹Juhayman Al-Utaybi, *Risalat al-Imarawa al-Bay'ana at-Ta'awa Hukumi Talbia al-Hukkam 'ala Talabat al-Imwa al-'Amm* (The Letter of State, Allegiance and Obedience, and the Ruling on the Ruler's Deceit of the Religious Students and Public) available at <http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=fcchouzr> (accessed 10 April 2018); Wagemakers, Joas, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi", pp. 59-69.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Wagemakers, Joas, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi", p. 91. See also Al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad, *Millat Ibrahim wa Da'wat al-Anbiya' wa al-Mursalin* available at <http://www.tawhed.ws/r1?i=1394&cx=iti4u3zp> (accessed 15 December 2018).

⁹³Interview with Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi in 1426H (2005) by Al-Asr electronic magazine available at <http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=040309gb> (accessed 12 December 2018).

⁹⁴Ibid.

While the *tawhid*, which we spoke of, entails *al-bara'* (the disavowal of) and disbelief in these man-made laws and scattered idols, one of its trustworthy ties is the subject of *al-wala' walbara'*, which requires the disavowal of the authors of these laws and regulations and the people who are applying them'.⁹⁵

The third and last pillar of the Jihadi Salafism, according to Al-Maqdisi is *jihad*.⁹⁶ In many of his writings, Al-Maqdisi refers to *jihad* as the 'highest rank' of showing *bara'* and enmity by 'striving for the demise of *al-nuzum al-taghutiyah* (regimes that do not rule according to God's revelation) and fighting its servants until the religion is all to God'.⁹⁷ In his book *Millat Ibrahim*, Al-Maqdisi condemned Muslim rulers for their political behavior. In it, he criticizes the Christian and Jewish faiths and developed its theme of WB based on the *Millat Ibrahim* Quranic verses of 60:4 as discussed in Chapter Two. This Quranic verse crystalizes the theme of contemporary militant Islamists that reject any form of nationalism or individualism if it does not submit to the laws of God. The setting for this is clear as well; there will always be enmity and hatred between the believers and unbelievers.

In *Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya fi kufr al-Dawlah al-Sa'udiyyah*, Al-Maqdisi claims that Muslim governments and their leaders were in a state of *kufr*, thus practising the act of *takfir*.⁹⁸ He also calls Muslim youth to turn against their rulers, scholars and societies. Referring to the few Saudis who were influenced by the takfiri ideology that they encountered in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s, Al-Maqdisi writes in his *Al-Kawashif*:

Here are the waves of young Saudi people, who are trained on weapons and explosives, returning after they had benefited since they came out of the walls of the Arabian Peninsula and come into contact and mixed with their brethren preachers from around the globe.... The thought of *takfir* and fighting the government and all of those who have championed, supported and been loyal to it has spread among trained young people, who returned from Afghanistan like wildfire. And here are the waves of young people returning with dozens of books exposing the *tughat* (despotic rulers) of Al-Saud.⁹⁹

Al-Maqdisi accused the Saudi government of straying from the path of Islam. He rejects the legitimacy of the Saudi government under the doctrine of WB, saying it "has left the religion of Islam" (*qadkharajat min din al-Islam*) due to: (1) loyalty to un-Islamic laws and its "loyalty to the infidel enemies of God" (*muwalat a 'da' Allah min al-kuffar*); (2) "strengthening of brotherly ties" (*tawthiqranabit al-ikhwa*) and its "love, affection and friendship" (*al-mawaddawal-hubbmal-sadaqa*) with non-Muslims; and (3) in spite of its pious Wahhabi image, is no different from "the other idolatrous Arab systems" (*al-anzima al-taghutiyah al-'Arabiyyah al-ukbra*).¹⁰⁰

It is worth mentioning here that although the vast majority of Muslim scholars including the official and mainstream scholars of Saudi Arabia agree on the fact that ruling according to God's revelation is *wajib* (mandatory) upon Muslims, they disagree with Al-Maqdisi and his *jihadi* orientation's logic and justification of *takfir* because, contrary to the Jihadi-Salafi's opinion, they view un-Islamic rule, if not accompanied by *jubud* (denial of the revelation) or *istihlal* (the belief that man-made laws are permissible in Islam),

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷ Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, *Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya fi Kufr al-Dawla As-Sa'udiyya*, second edition, 1421H, p. 130 available at <http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=2qrikosd> (accessed 12 December 2018), Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, *Millat Ibrahim* (1984) available at <http://www.tawhed.ws/r1?i=1394&x=iti4u3zp> (accessed 12 December 2018). See also Wagemakers, Joas, "Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: A Counter-Terrorism Asset", in *CTC Sentinel*, May 2008, Vol. 1, issue 6, p. 7. See also Kazimi Nibras, *A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi upstages Maqdisi*, in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 2, p. 59 published by the Hudson Institute, Washington D.C., 2005 available at <http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/a-virulent-ideology-in-mutation-zarqawi-upstages-maqdisi> (accessed 02 August 2018); Wagemakers, Joas, *Framing the "threat to Islam": al-wala' wa al-bara' in Salafi discourse* available at <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Framing+the+%22threat+to+Islam%22:+al-wala'+wa+al-bara'+in+Salafi...-a0197801513> (accessed 13 December 2018).

⁹⁸It is worth noting here that as Hegghammer writes "The Obvious Proofs represented the first socio-revolutionary treatise articulated in Wahhabi religious discourse and was thus particularly inflammable in the kingdom". See Hegghammer, Thomas, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan Islamism since 1979*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010, p. 47.

⁹⁹ Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, *Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyyah fi Kufr al-Dawlah Al-Sa'udiyyah*, p. 222 .

¹⁰⁰Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad, *Kashf al-Niqab 'an Sbari 'at al-Ghab*, quoted in Wagemakers, Joas, *Framing the "threat to Islam": al-Wala' wa al-Bara' in Salafi discourse*.

As minor unbelief (*kufrasghar*) which does not expel one from Islam, rather than major unbelief (*kufrakbar*) which does expel one from Islam.¹⁰¹ There are serious divisions among Salafis nowadays as to whether the concept of WB can form the basis for violent engagement with non-Muslims as well as *takfir* of Muslim rulers, as many of the Salafi Jihadis argue.¹⁰² As Wagemakers writes, ‘this issue is possibly the main bone of contention with regard to *kufr* between apolitical Salafis and their militant counterparts of Salafism’s jihadi branch’.¹⁰³ Haykel correctly points out that the main problem and salient point about *takfir* is that,

It legitimises the use of violence against the person or entity that is deemed to be non-Muslim, and one consequence of this is that armed rebellion, often termed *jihad*, against a nominally Muslim-led state (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Egypt) is considered not only legitimate, but a religious duty incumbent upon the individual believer.¹⁰⁴

Towards the end of 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, a group of young local Jihadi Salafi Saudi scholars, who would place themselves under the patronage of Al-Shuaibi, would emerge and play a pivotal role in the radicalization of some Saudi youths and their recruitment to militant Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda.¹⁰⁵ As evidenced by their writings, their views on the issues of *jihad*, WB and not ruling in accordance with God’s revelation echo the views of Al-Maqdisi and his like-minded Jihadi Salafi scholars and ideologues.¹⁰⁶ As explained earlier, in the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, these scholars, contrary to the official and mainstream scholars of Saudi Arabia, have invoked and relied heavily on the concept of WB in order to urge Muslims to take sides in the conflict and declare any form of support for or association with non-Muslims as *kufr*.¹⁰⁷

Al-Maqdisi have even addressed a praising letter to Al-Shuaibi, just a few months before the latter’s death in January 2002, in which he expressed his joy, pride and returned hope as a result of Al-Shuaibi’s latest *fatwas*, views and position, which came at a time when ‘the government’s scholars distorted religion and humiliated it at the gates of the sultans’.¹⁰⁸

What is essential for us to understand here is that, as Hegghammer writes ‘what the Al-Shuaibi scholars did was to articulate a Wahhabi justification for global jihadi much the same way that Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi had articulated a Wahhabi socio-revolutionary discourse in the late 1980s’.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰¹See *fatwa* by Sheikh Ibn Baz on ‘Ruling on Who Rules According to Man-Made laws (*Hukum Man Hakam bi al-Qawanin al-Wad’iyyah*)’ available at <http://www.binbaz.org.sa/mat/4138> (accessed 10 January 2018). See also Wagemakers, Joas, ‘The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’* in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi’, pp. 99-101.

¹⁰²Haykel, Bernard, ‘On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action’, pp 49-50.

¹⁰³Wagemakers, Joas, ‘The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’* in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi’, pp. 99-100.

¹⁰⁴Haykel, Bernard, ‘On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action’, p. 50.

¹⁰⁵Hegghammer, Thomas, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia*, pp. 83-98; Lacroix, Stephane and Holoch, George, *Awakening Islam: Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*, Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. 249-255.

¹⁰⁶See for example Al-Shuaibi, Hamud (1999), *Hukum al-Jihad fi Al-ShishannaWajib al-MusliminTijab Al-Mujahidin Hunak*(Ruling on Jihad in Chechnyaand the Obligation on Muslims Towards the Mujahidin there) available at

<http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=rfd8m6m> (accessed 12 January 2012), *Fatwa fi al-hukum bi ghayr ma anza la Allah* (Fatwa on the Ruler who Does Not Rule with God’s Revelation) available at <http://www.al-oglaa.com/?section+subject&subjectID=161> (accessed 12 January 2012), *Fatwa fi al-Tabakumila al-Qawanin al-Wad’iyya* (Fatwa on Resorting to Man-Made Laws) available at

<http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=rqvd4u6d> (accessed 12 January 2012); Al-Fahad, Nasir (2001), *At-Tibyan fi kufr man a’aana al-amrikan 1 & 2* (The Clarification on the Infidelity of Those who Assists the American 1&2) available at

<http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=0m8rjbf8> (accessed 20 January 2018), *Tali’at At-Tankil* (The Forefront of Condemnation) available at

<http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=utr56qdq> (accessed 20 January 2018); Al-Khudayr, Ali, *Ma Hukum al-Hakim bi Ghayr Ma Anzala Allah wa Ma al-WajibTijabah* (Ruling on the Ruler who does not Rule According to God’s revelation and the Duty Towards Him) available at <http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=ek5t5g60> (accessed 20 January 2018) and *Taqzīm al-Jihad* (Dwarfing Jihad) available at

<http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=8fz5ifzu> (accessed 31 January 2018).

¹⁰⁷Al-Shuaibi, Hamud, *Al-wala’ walbara’ waWujubNusrat Taliban wa Hokum Man Zabara al-Amrikan ‘Alayha* (Loyalty and Disavowal and the Obligation to Assist the Taliban and the Ruling on Whoever Assists the Americans Against Them) available at <http://www.al-oglaa.com/?section=subject&subjectID=163> (accessed 31 January 2018). See also Nasir Al-Fahd, *Al-Tibyan fi kufr man a’aana al-amrikan*.

¹⁰⁸Al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad, *Risalaila al-Sheikh al-Shuaibi* (Letter to Sheikh Al-Shuaibi) available at <http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i+6zipf6cz> (accessed 31 January 2018).

¹⁰⁹Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan Islamism since 1979*, p.97.

Even though not exclusively, the aforementioned scholars and ideologues of Jihadi Salafism have used and relied on the contentious and most radical elements in the heritage of the Wahhabi mission in order to justify, foster and convince their Saudi audience of their views and ideologies. Al-Maqdisi who turned the concept of WB into the core of his ideology, is an example of those who have used, relied and transformed some of the most radical statements and *fatwas* of the early scholars and followers of the Wahhabi mission in order to deceive their youth targets through the literal power of the text, which hides behind it a lot of interpretations and purposes to which they chose not to give attention.¹¹⁰ Jihadi Salafi scholars, ideologues and supporters have been trying consistently to legitimize their declarations and claims, rally new Saudi followers and undermine the Saudi state and its official scholars by tapping into the Kingdom's own source of legitimacy and religious heritage. By articulating their message in a Wahhabi religious discourse through the selective application of some of the early Wahhabi scholars without regard to their own specific temporal contexts, and by attacking the official religious scholar and accusing them of being *sultan* (ruler's scholars), they have ensured that their message would have a receptive audience in Saudi Arabia.

It is also important to notice that the social or religious as well as the political dimension of WB in early Wahhabism as seen from the events from the rival between the Saudis and Ottomans in the eighteenth century, and the civil war in the twentieth century has impacted and endured throughout the Wahhabi tradition for centuries. This can be seen in the writings of contemporary Wahhabi scholars such Al-Shuaibi, Al-Fahad and Al-Maqdisi. As Wagemakers states 'the two trends (social and political dimension of WB) are partly a result of the enduring legacy of the second Saudi state, which continues to resonate in scholarly writings on the subject of WB, and thus shows how one Wahhabi concept has changed over time and that Wahhabism is less uniform and inflexible than is popularly believed'.¹¹¹

Another important point to note here is that there is a presence of radical *takfiri* elements in the heritage of Wahhabi scholars. The fact of the matter is that while the Jihadi Salafi ideology and its ideologues have been 'heavily influenced by the thought of Sayyid Qutub, who elaborated on the twin concepts of *bakimiyah* and *jahiliyyah* to condemn the existing regimes in the Arab world and to sanction violent rebellion against them',¹¹² they have never ceased to quote from the texts and passages of the scholastic Salafism.

Conclusion

In this paper, the main factors which contributed to the development and transformation of the concept of WB in the Wahhabi ideology have been discussed. The flexible fluid nature of the concept of WB points to the fact that there exists a spectrum of Wahhabi ideology. There is no single and fixed Wahhabi and Salafi ideology, there are several. At one end there is the so-called official Wahhabism which is subservient to the authorities and adopt a more pragmatic approach, while at the other end there exists a revolutionary, uncompromising type which is often associated with the Jihadi Salafi groups.

As Wagemakers observes, the spectrum or flexibility of WB in Wahhabi discourse could be clearly seen in the thoughts and writings of two distinct groups i.e. the "quietest" who emphasized the social aspect of WB and the "radicals" who apply WB at the political level.¹¹³ In other words, the concept of WB specifically and the Wahhabi heritage in general can be both used to support and condemn the Saudi regime. The spectrum, however, is a continuum because the groups may not be distinctive from one another but may share certain tendencies and characteristics. For instance, with respect to the concept of WB, these groups are all socially conservative but they differ in their political discourses and strategies in dealing with resistance, relations with the authorities and non-Muslims. As such, sweeping assumptions that Salafi-Wahhabi ideology is solely responsible for the rise of terrorism, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, for example, are erroneous.

¹¹⁰Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Hadlaq, Director-General, Ideological Security Directorate of the Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh, 6 February 2010; Wagemakers, Joas, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *Al-Wala' wal Bara'* in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi", pp. 69-70.

¹¹¹Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, p. 94.

¹¹²Haykel, Bernard, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action", p. 48.

¹¹³Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wal Bara'*, p. 104.

The concept of WB first emerged in the Wahhabi ideology as a tool to fight *shirk* and *bid'ah* practices of the Muslims. For the most part, it is understood primarily in theological terms as the rejection of *kufr* and as loyalty to correct belief (*aqidah*).

It was manifested as a sectarian polemic against the Sunni majority, and as isolation from a non-believing wider society. This social reformation tool has since evolved into the political sphere to suit the needs of the players involved: whether to justify the actions of those in power or to those who oppose them. In essence, it shows that the concept is a fluid one: for whom should Muslims reserve their loyalty and love? Though Wahhabism utilizes the concept of WB with the intent to purify Muslims' loyalty and allegiance to God alone, it has also been used to demand the undivided loyalty to their Muslim rulers.